by BGEN Bruce B. Byrum, USMC, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Over the last several years, Marine Corps Aviation has been operating in an era of diminishing resources, with fewer Marines on our hangar decks, ever-aging aircraft on our flight line and a high tempo of operations within our units. The force structure reductions taken in 1992 did not appreciably help unit manning.
Percentages of on-hand manpower in a number of squadrons had dropped to minimum workable levels. The technical military specialties that required more time to recruit and train were hard to keep filled. Operational tempos were being driven as much from within a unit as from without. Squadrons worked long hours, routinely deferred non-critical maintenance and regularly overflew planned aircraft usage rates. All this was in an effort to meet largely self-generated flight-hour goals that had little direct correlation to actual aircrew training readiness. Maintenance manpower was already operating at surge levels, and we were not even close to going to combat. Budgeting priorities did not allow for the timely replacement of aging aircraft, and this problem was being further aggravated by overflying the airframes. Additionally, maintenance that was needed to keep up the long-term material condition of the aircraft was being deferred for the sake of making the flight schedule.
The flight schedule was being driven more by a quest to produce sorties and to fly than it was by actual training events and refly factors. In other words, aircrew training became a product of the flight schedule rather than the flight schedule being a product of the squadron's training requirements.
The question we had to ask was, "Why should flight hours be the principal metric for measuring pilot proficiency?" Why not base aircrew training on the numbers of events completed rather than numbers of hours flown? After all, the U.S. Air Force had been doing sortie-based training for several years, and their pilots' abilities were equivalent to our own.
Another factor driving aircrew training requirements was the result of a gradual mission creep in our training syllabus over time. Some squadrons were expending critical resources training for a mission that was not relevant or intended for them. At this juncture, the leadership within Marine Corps Aviation saw an overwhelming need to return to the basics, and directed a complete scrub of all training and readiness programs. Missions not considered core to the capabilities expected of that type/model/series aircraft were eliminated. Improvements in the quality and fidelity of aircraft simulation were taken into consideration, and training sorties that could be reliably flown in a ground-based simulator instead of an aircraft were identified.
This revalidation of aircrew training requirements and the identification of core competencies was intended to help unit commanders better manage squadron resources and improve overall unit readiness. A by-product of this process was a reduction in the overall number of flight hours needed to sustain essential unit readiness. A reduced flying hour requirement decreased the squadrons' operational tempo and returned aircraft utilization to a level that was more sustainable over the life of the aircraft. Reduced tempo also made more time available for maintenance. This, along with setting limits on the amount of maintenance that could be deferred, improved the all-round material condition of our aircraft. Although the Marine Corps has only been operating under this new process for a little over a year, the results have already shown success.
Although a main factor perpetuating the overuse of resources has been addressed, we have not resolved some of our resource quality issues. For example, while we have been moderately successful in increasing squadron manpower levels, a large portion of the work force is fresh out of school and, although trained, is largely unskilled and inexperienced. The next step will be to investigate ways of improving our enlisted maintenance training and skill levels.
We will start by developing a training and readiness program modeled along the same lines as the one used by aircrews. This building-block approach will provide measured qualification and certification standards as well as set timelines for periodic recertification of skills. We believe that this, along with a more robust program of distributed computer-based training, will allow us to provide the appropriate level training to the right individual at the right time. We will also work with our civilian technical representatives and the engineering support agencies to make better use of their experience to teach good maintenance practices and skills to our enlisted work force while on the job.
Another significant effort has been put into replacing and upgrading our aircraft as we can afford it. One of the Marine Corps' number-one priorities has been the replacement of our aging CH-46 medium-lift helicopter. The MV-22 Osprey is currently well into its developmental testing, exceeding all expectations and meeting new milestones every month. Through new tilt rotor technology, extended range and speed are easily achieved, and the MV-22 is proving to be more of a medium transport than a helicopter. The only real similarities it shares with helicopters are its size and its ability to take off and land vertically. The introduction of the MV-22 will mark a milestone in Marine Corps Aviation and will significantly impact how we employ Navy and Marine forces in the future. It is hard for us to even imagine all the uses this aircraft may have and how it might eventually be employed.
Along with the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the Landing Craft Air Cushion, the MV-22 Osprey will have a monumental impact on the way we have traditionally conducted ship-to-shore movement. Able to now go farther and faster, Navy and Marine forces will be able to perform a broad range of missions over an even larger geographic area. Developing concepts such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea will forever change the way we conduct naval operations. Amphibious naval forces, used in conjunction with evolving maritime prepositioning concepts, will provide Marine forces with the ability to operate "from the sea" without the traditional buildup of forces ashore. As these new concepts evolve, Navy and Marine forces will place less reliance on establishing beachheads and the traditional ship-to-shore movement, and will put more emphasis on the use of aircraft. Although we will be able to transport Marines faster and over longer distances, in order to operationally and logistically support these Marines, we will be largely dependent on the same assets that transported them.
The CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter, with its capacity to quickly move large quantities of material, will continue to be a workhorse. Under new logistic support concepts, the CH-53E can be expected to take on a greater role moving supplies directly to ground combat forces. Concepts like "forward arming and refueling points" will take on even broader implications for aviation as its supporting role expands.
Although the Marine Corps has embarked on a program to upgrade its AH-1W Cobra and UH-1N Huey helicopters with a more capable four-bladed rotor system, the helo still will lack the speed and range to keep up with the MV-22. New concepts and tactics will need to be developed in order that the assault support capabilities of both these helicopters will remain available to the ground combat element. Likewise, the KC-130, in combination with the aerial refueling capability of MV-22, remain crucial to the Marine Corps' continued requirement to be able to self deploy and to extend the range of maritime forces.
The Marine Corps is committed to becoming more expeditionary and sustainable. We will look for innovative ways to provide improved expeditionary command, control and supporting fire ashore. One objective will be to reduce the size of the force and the amount of equipment that has to be supported ashore without sacrificing combat capability. With an eye toward providing the type of tactical air support we expect will be needed in the future, and to also reduce the number of different types of aircraft we try to support, the Marine Corps will replace our AV-8B Harrier and the F/A-18C/D Hornet with the short takeoff, vertical-landing (STOVL) version of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The STOVL version of JSF will be comparable in capability with other JSF, but will also provide the unique capacity to operate from a variety of Navy ships as well as from austere landing sites ashore. Until introduction of JSF in about 2010, the Marine Corps will continue to provide AV-8Bs, F/A-18C/Ds and EA-6Bs as part of forward-deployed Navy and Marine Corps forces.
The applications for forward-deployed naval forces with their broad range of capabilities will be as important in the future as they are today. Whether involved in humanitarian missions or armed conflict, the naval expeditionary nature of our Navy and Marine Corps forces allows us to rapidly build up military power without significant reliance on strategic lift or host-nation support. As our ability to operate over extended ranges increases and the amount of equipment we take ashore decreases, direct air support from Naval Aviation will become an increasingly important force multiplier. The ability to closely integrate our tactical aviation with joint operations ashore will be absolutely essential. Our "Naval-air-ground team" coming "from the sea" will continue to provide a wide range of complementary military capabilities in support of the United States' interests worldwide.
Ed. Note: The Hook magazine is pleased to welcome the Commandant of the Marine Corps' perspective, an essential part of the potent Navy/Marine Corps team, with its vision for the future. BGEN Bruce B. Byrum currently serves as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters, USMC, Washington, D.C. His first assignment following his designation as a Naval Aviator in 1970 was flying the A-6A Intruder with VMA(AW)-224, which deployed to the Gulf of Tonkin aboard the carrier USS Coral Sea (CVA-43). He flew 125 combat missions over Vietnam and Laos, and later served as communications officer for Marine Aircraft Group 14. This was followed by a tour with the Naval Training Command as a flight instructor in VT-7 at Meridian, Miss., flying the TA-4 Skyhawk. Later tours were as XO and CO of VMA(AW)-533 flying the A-6E on board Saratoga (CV-60) and John F. Kennedy (CV-67). GEN Byrum has been assigned to Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe in Naples, Italy, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic, in Norfolk, Va., Fleet Marine Force, Europe and as Deputy Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic. He then served as the Deputy Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and subsequently as Commanding General, Third Force Service Support Group, Okinawa, Japan.